Hannibal Read online

  Hannibal wasn’t altogether successful in keeping his march secret, as word did make it to both Massilia and beyond to the Romans, but he still kept his enemies guessing due to his relative speed. It is likely that at about the same time that Hannibal arrived on the west bank of the Rhône, Cornelius Scipio’s Roman fleet arrived at Massilia. The fleet had sailed for at least a week from Etruria and Liguria (the region around modern Genoa) with an army on board to try to stop Hannibal from traveling east along the Mediterranean coast, the usual route connecting Gaul and Italy.

  The south-flowing Rhône made a major forking near a Celtic hamlet that would eventually become modern Arles (Roman Arelate), flooding into the swampy delta with western and eastern branches. As the army approached the river itself, Hannibal had to take decisive action, moving quickly because of some Celtic resistance and the likelihood that Rome would try to cut him off. At the same time, the swamplands near the mouth of the Rhône that separated Hannibal and Roman Massilia were so difficult to traverse and so sparsely populated that Hannibal could expect some lag time in his movements being relayed to the Romans. Cornelius Scipio consulted his tribunes (high military officers) after hearing that Hannibal was approaching the Rhône—unexpected since the Romans thought the enemy army would be literally bogged down by the marshy terrain and Celtic resistance—and decided to send out a cavalry group of three hundred to locate Hannibal as soon as possible. That maneuver, too, would also be difficult given the Camargue marshes.

  Here Hannibal would need a major logistics breakthrough in crossing the Rhône. He would need not only a place to ford the river but also an area where he could muster enough boats and garner assistance from locals to bring the volume of soldiers and animals with as much speed and safety as possible, especially since his own spies were probably aware of the arrival of the Roman fleet at Massilia.

  HANNIBAL READIES HIS CROSSING OF THE RHÔNE

  Because it was late summer, the mostly shallow river was at its lowest ebb, but it was still likely several hundred yards across, with the strongest current in the center of the channel. Hannibal’s army began massing on the west bank of the Rhône, most likely somewhere within a few miles of Avignon, where the river was a “single channel,” as Polybius says, “four days march from the sea.”1 Hannibal used a combination of bribery and force to sequester existing boats and facilitate quick construction of new rafts needed to transport an army. While most of the hostile clans of the Volcae tribe—which generally profited from controlling river transport here—massed together on the eastern bank of the Rhône, enough of the tribes on the western bank accommodated Hannibal’s army by selling their boats and canoes and aiding Hannibal’s carpenters:

  Hannibal bought every one of their canoes and boats, amounting to a considerable number, since many of the people along the Rhône engage in water transport. He also acquired from them suitable volume of logs to construct more canoes so that in two days he had an almost countless quantity of ferrying craft, aided by the fact that as many as possible among his own forces worked without stopping to get across the river.2

  Several motives underlie Hannibal’s acquisition of all the Celtic boats and available timber. The obvious reason is that he would need this quantity to get his force across; the less obvious reason may be that he wished to leave none in the hands of the Volcae and other tribes should they turn against him, always a possibility once the local people had been bribed rather than cooperate freely.

  But for whatever reason, the bulk of the Volcae Celts gathered on the opposite Rhône bank now tried to stop Hannibal’s army from crossing the river. Hannibal considered all his options. Although he could not force a vulnerable crossing with a massed Celtic attack waiting, he decided he could not afford to wait. Rather than risk having more Volcae and other Celts gather on the eastern bank and perhaps even on both banks of the Rhône, he made a brilliant move.

  HANNIBAL SENDS HANNO UPRIVER AND ACROSS WITH SMOKE SIGNALS

  On the third day beside the Rhône, Hannibal sent north a portion of his most mobile infantry and Numidian cavalry, with reliable Celts as guides. He dispatched all of them, most likely under cover of darkness, under the leadership of his relative Hanno, son of Bomilcar. They were to move quickly upriver on the western side and cross the Rhône at the shallowest fording place (probably at present-day Pont-St.-Esprit) with improvised boats—in this case, where the river is divided—and hide in a natural strong place for a day or two until the time was right. On the fifth night, they were to move stealthily south along the east bank, always just beyond the scouting range of the massed Volcae.

  Hannibal was ready to cross but waited for a prearranged smoke signal from Hanno and his forces on the eastern bank when they were within quick striking distance of the Volcae at the river. It was not yet dawn, and Hannibal had the boats filled, starting with heaviest boats on the north wing and the lighter boats on the south wing. As soon as the sky lightened to the east, Hannibal coordinated his scouts to watch for the smoke signal to the north announcing that his ambush across the river was advancing. When the signal came, Hannibal timed his order that sounded out in relays along the bank. Boats set off at once into the weakest current along the bank, with the heavier craft upriver absorbing some of the force.

  Voices of the opposing Volcae Celts could be heard across the river as they waited, brandishing their weapons, no doubt some of them howling their war cries that history has recorded as blood-curdling. Relishing the opportunity for what they thought would be fairly easy prey, working themselves up to their bravest raucousness, the Celts rushed to the river’s edge. Their first barrage of spears would have sailed some fifty yards into the water, mostly as a warning of what would be coming as the boats approached. Their arrows carried farther, but the crossing army would have shields up to absorb or deflect missiles. Many of the boats were slowed by towing horses behind them, as three or even four cavalry steeds were bridled uncomfortably and roped to boats, half swimming but also caught in the river flow and no doubt frantic. Even one awkward crossing would have taken upward of twenty minutes in the current for the vulnerable army to be within distance of Celtic projectiles. The river-bound army would have tried as much as possible to stay together and land en masse to present a continuous battle front along the river. The cacophony on both sides of the river must have been striking as Carthaginians shouted encouragement, matched by Celtic fervor.

  Hannibal’s timing was apparently perfect. Just as the waiting Celts watched their expected prey, a sudden disarray erupted at the back of the Volcae force. Hanno’s ambuscade had reached and set fire to their camp. Now the Celts realized that they were fighting the force coming from the river and another coming from behind, something they had not anticipated. This fearful discovery sent them into a panic.

  HANNIBAL’S ARMY CROSSES THE RHÔNE

  Hannibal must have crossed with the very first group of invaders because he immediately led his disciplined men with exhortations to meet the panicking Celts, many of whom were first looking forward and then looking backward. It was too much for the surprised Celts, who mostly turned and fled from Hannibal’s tightly advancing veterans. Hannibal set himself to bring over the rest of his infantry and cavalry as soon as it was feasible, and within short order, this was accomplished with little resistance from the Volcae, who retreated far from his army. That night, Hannibal’s army camped not far from the river on the east bank, with posted sentries watching for any Volcae who might sneak up on the camp and wreak havoc, although they did not bother him again.3 Early the next morning, Hannibal confirmed the report that the Romans were at Massilia and dispatched five hundred cavalry to reconnoiter the situation from a safe distance.

  THE ELEPHANTS CROSS THE RIVER

  Hannibal apparently now had at least thirty-seven war elephants on the journey, brought all the way from Carthage when young and trained in Spain. In order to transport them, engineers had to create connected double rafts that looked almost like floating bridges. These c
onstructions were secured by ropes tied to trees on both banks. Smaller rafts were lined up and linked by ropes and tow lines to the “bridge” until nearly the whole river width was covered except for the exact center, where the many small rafts would travel back and forth. The elephants were fairly manageable until on the small rafts, when the beasts perceived they were actually floating on an unstable water surface. Many elephants stampeded at this point, and their mahouts (trained men who rode or guided them) were thrown off and into the river, where a considerable number drowned in the melee. The elephants, however, did manage to put their feet down in the shallow places or even swam in a lumbering fashion. If the water was too deep for them, they held their trunks over the river surface while their heads were mostly underwater, and in this manner, many elephants “snorkeled” across the river. Not one elephant was reported lost, according to Polybius’ text, which must have derived from an eyewitness account.4

  MEETING CELTIC TRIBES FROM ITALY AND ROMANS IN A GAUL SKIRMISH

  Polybius reports two other important events about this time. The first is that the friendly Celts of Italy, led by Magilus (or Magol) of the Boii tribe (near Bologna), met on the Rhône’s east bank with Hannibal and his officers, encouraging the army with their alliance and explaining what to expect from the more capricious Celts en route. Hannibal’s army was particularly impressed and heartened by seeing Celts from distant lands who were on their side.5 The second event was that Hannibal’s scouting party of Numidian cavalry returned.6 It happened that Cornelius Scipio had also sent out a reconnoitering force of cavalry to look for Hannibal’s army, and the two enemy groups of horsemen actually ran into each other, either by accident or design. A deadly skirmish ensued, with the Carthaginians losing about 200 men, and the Romans and Massilians losing about 140. But this wetland clash slightly to the south in the Camargue had actually aided Hannibal’s Rhône crossing by delaying the Roman contingent. By the time the Roman cavalry whirled back south to give an account to Scipio, Hannibal was already across the Rhône and marching north. Scipio gave chase with his army and found the abandoned camp, but the ashes of Carthaginian campfires were long cold.7 To the Romans’ great consternation, the first of many, Hannibal’s army had disappeared completely.

  The question is often asked why Hannibal avoided fighting the Romans here in Gaul. Hoyos suggests one reasonable answer: Hannibal was aiming to make as many allies of Celts as possible, whether disaffected with Rome or not. “Fighting the Romans in Gallic territory, even if he won the Gauls as allies or kept them neutral, was not a scheme likely to please people whose lands would bear the brunt.”8

  HANNIBAL’S ARMY MOVES NORTH

  Moving north through upper Provence into the Drôme region, Hannibal could at times see the Alpes-Maritimes to the East. While the topography along the Rhône is mostly low here, Hannibal’s scouts and his Celtic guides could ascertain the mountains’ presence even when not visible by the cumulonimbus storm clouds that often rose above them. Cornelius Scipio did not rush off after Hannibal, of whose craftiness the Roman was now thoroughly persuaded.

  Cornelius Scipio pondered the possibilities and deduced accurately that Hannibal was going north to avoid Massilia and the coastal route, attempting instead a most implausible ascent of the Alps. Hannibal would be trying to reach Italy by a route that not even a war veteran like Scipio would have predicted. Cornelius Scipio’s Celtic allies affirmed that while such a tactic would be possible, it would be difficult this time of year, and neither he nor Hannibal should attempt it. Cornelius Scipio hastily sent his brother Gnaeus Scipio to Spain with half an army to disrupt the Carthaginian supply route and subdue Celtiberians or persuade them even by force to side with the Romans. Cornelius Scipio then wasted no time in setting sail back to Italy to meet Hannibal’s army when and where it emerged from the fearsome Alps—if it emerged at all. We can wonder if, in addition to the Roman control of the coastal route, Hannibal was also predisposed to going over the Alps because his god—after whom he was named—was a god of mountains and storms.

  Seven

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  GATEWAY TO THE ALPS

  After turning north with his army column into the gradually narrowing Rhône Valley, Hannibal left behind sunny Provence. By the time the path through Gaul approached modern Montélimar on the Rhône, the distant jagged peaks of the Alps could be glimpsed from time to time eastward, especially up the Val Drôme where the Drôme River comes in. During the four-day march, Hannibal encountered little resistance from the Celts, but this does not mean that they were not watching his progress carefully. If anything, these Celts were not interested in delaying a hungry army that would overrun their farms, deplete their resources, or worse.1 Hannibal may have purchased food provisions from time to time, distributing some Punic silver rather than risk a fight from bands of gathering Celtic warriors. He did not want anything to slow his progress by now.

  September had come, and the leaves of deciduous trees that had been turning golden yellow were accompanied by increasingly cooler nights. Fall winds began to strip the trees, and more and more bare branches showed along the way. Stream waters to be crossed, however depleted by decreased runoff, were now considerably colder than when the army had started in Spain’s summer.

  The army paused in a low and fertile plain that formed a vast triangle where the fast Isère flows into the Rhône from the east.2 This river junction was the traditional tribal boundary of the populous Allobroges for centuries3 and in 125 BCE Romans would confront a combined army of Allobroges and Arveni from the Central Massif. Hannibal’s army now encountered the Allobroges, the largest Celtic tribe yet, one whose territory stretched much of the way along the Rhône north of the Isère. One center of the Allobroges was near what would become Geneva, Switzerland; another was near modern Grenoble.4 This part of Gaul between the Rhône and the Isère was most likely the delta region Polybius called “the Island.”5 Immediately to the east of the Rhône and south of the Isère, the Pre-Alps massifs begin to ascend to the northeast.6 The Alpine pass route and the ultimate summit that follows—not the only reasonable possibility for the march—nonetheless aptly fit the difficult terrain and challenging high altitude for the conditions Hannibal’s army encountered, according to Polybius.

  HANNIBAL INTERCEDES IN A CHIEFLY DISPUTE

  At this time, two chieftain brothers had a leadership dispute about which of them should be the king. Apparently only the eldest brother cautiously sent a peaceful delegation to meet Hannibal, making a personal overture to him to assist in placing him on the throne. Whether the younger brother also reached out is unknown, as Polybius does not say. But Hannibal agreed to this apparently sensible request: by a show of force, he drove away any supporters of the younger brother who were present.

  In visible gratitude, the new chief of the Isère lowland plain supplied Hannibal’s army with much-needed provisions of ample food, fresher weapons, and warmer clothing for the journey approaching colder weather, including thick leather shoes.7 Hannibal’s army was also grateful for an armed guard from the chief marching at its rear.

  This eastward passage of the army along the Isère traversed some of the richest farm country in Gaul, with farms that were also plentiful in cattle. Harvests were stored in the Celts’ wooden barns. Nearly all farming had stopped for the fall, as the last edible tubers and roots were dug out of the ground and stored carefully in cellars. Because this is fertile land, the elder brother could afford to sell to Hannibal or give him ample surplus agricultural bounty. Not so the brother to the east, whose territory lay within the mountain valleys, a far more rugged land.

  On the south side of the Isère River, the brooding massifs approach closer and closer in the formidable, thickly wooded Vercors Pre-Alps that rise nearly vertical only a few miles from the river canyon. About this land, Polybius commented, “[H]ere the baseline is formed by a range of mountains difficult to climb and, one may say, almost inaccessible.”8 The impenetrability of the Vercor massifs was borne out dur
ing World War II, when the famously tenacious Vercor French Resistance proved impossible for the Germans and the Vichy government to root out. This was the mountain territory of the other Allobroges brother. Hannibal may have second-guessed his earlier decision, but it was too late if he wanted to advance eastward here.

  GATEWAY TO THE ALPS

  Just to the north, outside of modern Grenoble, are the twin bluffs of the towering “Gateway to the Alps,” where the Isère River bursts through the mountains from narrow valleys upriver.9 The Vercors Massif rises on the southwest, and the Chartreuse Massif rises on the northeast side of the narrow Isère. Rising abruptly on average more than two thousand spectacular feet from the river canyon that is just under six hundred feet in elevation, these massif ridges look literally like a huge broken wall. Here the Isère River pours out of the mountains.

  This is the narrowest canyon of the lower Isère. The only easy passage is squeezed into an alluvial valley, full of sediment from floods, alongside the river: an opening no wider than three-quarters of a mile and shared by the river. Anyone would have sensed danger here—especially the acutely pragmatic Hannibal—and trouble was not long in coming. Unfortunately for the Carthaginians, their lowland Allobroges allies would go no farther and returned homeward.10 They knew Hannibal’s predicament and knew also how they themselves would be received here by their now-aggrieved kinsmen.