Hannibal Page 20
Gnaeus Scipio had moved with his army, including many Celtiberians, to attack an encamped Hasdrubal Barca and was unaware of his brother’s fate. Hasdrubal made no move to engage and stayed in his secure encampment with his army. But then after annihilating Publius Scipio’s Roman army, the combined army of Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco turned north to track down Gnaeus Scipio. When he heard of the Punic forces coming—possibly also fearing his brother’s death by now—he faced another grim fact in the desertion of his Celtiberian mercenaries near Ilorca. Scipio knew he would have a grave disadvantage far outnumbered by two experienced generals in their own territory. Gnaeus Scipio retreated north hastily, aiming to make it back to the Ebro, but Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco caught up with the Romans later at Ilorca. Hasdrubal Barca now also arrived with his army, and the Roman situation was desperate: facing three Carthaginian armies. The Romans tried to fortify a rocky hilltop in short time but were unsuccessful in digging into the stony soil or making an earthwork berm.
Like Castulo, the Battle of Ilorca was a hopeless defeat for the Romans, as the three combined Punic armies overwhelmed their hastily assembled barricade of baggage and saddles from all sides and slaughtered the Romans and their general, Gnaeus Scipio. In this dual battle in the campaign of the Upper Baetis River, at Castulo and Ilorca, the Romans lost not only their two generals but also around twenty-two thousand soldiers. Looking for blame, Livy claims the Scipios were overreliant on their Celtiberian mercenaries, who deserted because Hasdrubal had bribed them with silver.8 When word eventually made its way to Rome from the fugitive Romans who had escaped back to Tarraco, numbering about eight thousand, Rome was devastated. Roman interests in Spain were also in shock and the loss was mourned as a national disaster in Rome.9 Perhaps worse, the defeats and deaths of the Scipio brothers was a disaster that lost for Rome all of Spain south of the Ebro River, presumably also Saguntum, and even put Tarraco under risk of Punic attack again.10
After Capua had fallen back to Rome within the next year, the Senate sent the praetor Claudius Nero with an army of ten thousand, leaving with a fleet from Puteoli in 211 and arriving near Tarraco to bolster the area north of the Ebro. Having destroyed the armies of the Scipio brothers and feeling some relief, Hasdrubal Barca ventured north beyond the Ebro. But Claudius Nero trapped Hasdrubal unusually far north among the Ausetani tribe in a gorge called “Black Stones” in the foothills of the Pyrenees in Catalonia, where he was likely stirring up trouble against Rome on Ausetani turf. Hasdrubal engaged in some diplomatic sleight of hand by calling on Claudius Nero’s patrician largesse, promising he would leave Spain altogether with his army if let go. Did Nero know this was the son of Hamilcar? Claudius Nero was left with egg on his face in the ensuing space of several nights when Hasdrubal sent a flurry of messengers with different proposals before he would enter formal negotiation; in reality, he was quietly evacuating his men under cover of darkness, slipping soldiers and even elephants away little by little. Requesting a last day of postponement with time for a private religious ceremony, Hasdrubal used a thick fog to hide his remaining troop movements that night. Finally, morning dawned clear, and Claudius Nero’s men saw a deserted Carthaginian camp. The Romans gave chase, but Hasdrubal faced only hasty skirmishes as he escaped,11 moving his forces back south of the Ebro all the way to central Spain, effectively out of reach.
Nineteen
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SCIPIO CAPTURES CARTAGENA
After his father’s death in Spain, the young Publius Cornelius Scipio (later Africanus,1 whom I will call Scipio from now on), had been only about twenty years old as a likely survivor at Cannae and was now about twenty-six in 210. Normally that was too young to command, and although a patrician from one of the best Roman families serving in the military, the Cornelii Scipiones, he had not climbed enough ranks of the cursus honorum with the necessary time in grade in the offices. Polybius asserts that Scipio helped save his wounded father’s life at the Battle of Ticinus in 218,2 when he would have been about seventeen or eighteen, and Livy likewise relates a now-famous romantic story about young Scipio surviving Cannae as a young officer and, at Canusium, taking a vow with bared sword in front of other survivors to never desert Rome.3 Others have suggested the romantic story of the vow is a late embellishment, probably by Livy, since Polybius makes no mention of it, but that Scipio likely was at Cannae—possibly even a very young military tribune under Aemilius Paullus.4
Now since Spain required new leadership to fill the gap created by the deaths of his father and uncle, the consuls Cnaeus Fulvius Centimalus and Publius Sulpicius Galba called the Senate’s electoral comitia centuriata—an assembly that elected annual consuls, praetors, and censors—to convene and choose in a special election a leader who would measure up to the challenges of Spain. Scipio had been a military tribune5 and had only been a curule aedile (a magistrate supervising markets) a few years before in 213, but he certainly had not yet been a praetor or consul with authority to lead an army.
Derived mostly from Livy’s hagiography but also from Polybius, who compares Scipio to the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus,6 many historians7 have commented on how young Scipio sat in temples—ostensibly meditating and communicating with the gods of Rome—and related “dreams” where the gods intervened on his behalf. If Scipio was prepossessed with his possible future role, he was certainly also planning it well, making every effort to influence public opinion on his behalf by allowing people to draw favorable conclusions about him—neither denying nor confirming supposed marvels at his birth that recalled Alexander8—and his hinting at every opportunity of his divine mission. One military historian makes it clear that Polybius is to be read that one “acting on dreams and omens alone would not have won such an empire,” rather to not underestimate Scipio’s exceptional mind.9 Scipio was no doubt subtler and more psychologically complicated than even the normally religiously skeptical but admiring Polybius understood, along with modern commentators who may see his publicly “religious” side as persuasively manipulative rather than brilliant and insightful. Even Livy says he “prepared men’s minds”—planting ideas that he most likely carefully constructed for a considerable time—and Polybius accepts that Scipio calculatingly “instilled into men the belief his projects were divinely inspired” without criticizing him for it.10 Scipio is one of the best examples in history of a leader who planned carefully, not only for his battles but also how to bend people to his will. Scipio knew that many people are persuaded more by religion than by reason, and that power of devotion often trumps power of deduction; no doubt a Machiavelli could later paraphrase this.
Whether or not Scipio was the sole candidate for leading Rome’s forces in Spain, he was the primary adult heir of the Scipio clan—seemingly paterfamilias—but a privatus, or private citizen, rather than a ranking officer. Spain, after all, was not an easy place for a Roman general with inadequate supplies battling vast Punic assets. He did have military experience from the Battles of Ticinus and Cannae, but his appointment was about as extraordinary as he was. In some sense, it shows some desperation brought on Rome by the dire loss of his father and uncle, but other factors were also invested in his choice, such as the patrician families ruling the Senate. The comitia centuriata could not actually elect him, but its formal vote possibly legitimized an already-made decision as one historian notes, adding that part of the mystery of the choice of Scipio may have been name recognition in Spain. His father and uncle had already courted Celtiberian tribes, and continuity could be an asset.11 Named commander of Spain—actually proconsul—Scipio was given ten thousand infantry to add to the eighteen thousand in Tarraco and north of the Ebro, and he left the Roman port of Ostia with thirty ships and landed at Emporion (Empúries, Catalonia) in late 210.
SCIPIO CAPTURES CARTAGENA
Yet a sure sign of the future was the bold and brilliant taking of Cartagena (Punic Qart Hadasht) in 209 by young Scipio, almost in the mold of Hannibal. The great personal loss of his father and uncle in 212 seemed to hav
e increased his motivation to give Rome greater success, and he certainly needed to balance the miasma of his family tragedy, one that had the superstitious apparition in Rome of misfortune, which could taint a family if the gods were perceived as averse. Scipio certainly knew that during the winter of 210 in Spain, the three Carthaginian armies were widely separated over a considerable distance of hundreds of miles, with at least one in the south near Gades under Hasdrubal Gisgo; another to the west of Cartagena near Castulo under Mago; and another under Hasdrubal Barca, most likely also in the west among the Carpetani tribe at the headwaters of the Tagus River near Toledo in central Spain, southwest of the Ebro but northwest of Cartagena.12
Because the road to Cartagena was thus open, unprotected by Cartha-ginian forces and only a ten days’ march away at a distance of 280 miles, this fact encouraged Scipio to plan a move as daring as any. It was a great risk but also a great undertaking if planned carefully, something Polybius says was his hallmark.13 Cartagena—Carthago Nova (New Carthage) is the Latin translation of Qart Hadasht14—had the best harbor in Spain and was enormously wealthy. Perhaps Cartagena stored more bullion than Carthage kept at home, since the Spanish silver mines a few miles away around La Unión to the east and other mines north of that between Murcia and the red-hued Los Victorias hills—many less than a day’s journey away on foot—were so rich. Polybius points out how much Carthage itself depended on Cartagena, offering such great service to the Punic enemy that funded damage to Rome.15 This prize, seemingly so far away but casually defended, was an irresistible lure that would help realize Scipio’s vast political ambitions if only he could take it, thereby also cutting off any hope Hannibal had of resupply from Spain either of silver or Iberian allies.16 Without waiting for any permission from Rome, Scipio shared his plan with only Gaius Laelius, a Roman admiral and friend, to prevent word getting to the far-off Carthaginian armies who thought Cartagena was both a safe distance from any Romans and also nearly invincible in its maritime setting. At the outset, Scipio would be outnumbered by about three to one, given that his total force was, as Goldsworthy says, only “barely equal” to one of the three Punic armies in the field.17
After setting up 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry under Marcus Junius Silanus to guard the Ebro, Scipio assembled the fleet under Laelius at the mouth of the Ebro then near Dertosa and took off quickly with 25,000 troops and 2,500 cavalry on the march, with the fleet likely shadowing their journey offshore. While Polybius and Livy say the journey took a week, the length of the march is better understood as a week plus a few days,18 and although his army marched very fast and mostly by stealth—his advance scouts probably killed any hostile observers who could have sent messengers to Cartagena and possibly even to the Carthaginian armies in the field to the west and the south—Scipio arrived and quickly set up his army camp east of the walled city of Cartagena. At that time, Cartagena was on a peninsula flaring east from a narrower isthmus where the deep Gulf of Cartagena gave sea access from the south and a lagoon protected the city from the north. From the extant Roman theater, one can easily still see the remnant five hills of the ancient city, once covered with sacred areas and the Carthaginian citadel. The walls of the city only enclosed a circumference of twenty stades, or about 4,500 yards, according to Polybius.19 Mostly surprising the Carthaginians, the Roman fleet first rounded Cape de Palos from the north, sailed west, and entered the gulf harbor from the south under oar to ready the assault by sea facing the south-facing walls: Scipio’s army would attack by land on the isthmus mostly from the east.
Famous stories about Scipio telling his army of his dream of Neptune coming to his aid are great fodder for Scipio’s propaganda mill and enhanced his own carefully constructed legend by playing on Roman superstition, love of dreams, and attention to omens. But even if the stories are exaggerated, there are feasible interpretations of what local fishermen may have related about the extremely shallow water of the lagoon and daily wind-aided lowering of the lagoon surface and its ebbing.20
This battle underscores one of the worst issues in Carthaginian policy in Spain, a fault due either to Cartagena’s distance from Carthage or the lack of clear leadership in Spain in terms of chain of command—three disputing generals—or some other lacuna: Why were so few defenders in the city? Did they really think the city was invulnerable, or did they assume Roman power concentrated at Tarraco and the Ebro was too remote a threat? Polybius says the Carthaginians didn’t dream of anyone assaulting the city, when they controlled almost the whole of Spain.21 The city first tried to fend off seaward assault of Laelius that encircled the walls accessible on the gulf, putting the more trained Carthaginian forces there—up to a thousand men at hand—and leaving up to two thousand townsmen along the landward isthmus walls.
Scipio’s landward assault of the city walls on the east was not fully successful. He was beaten back at first. Normal assaults would, as Polybius suggests, wait a day or so to renew strength. One of Scipio’s multiple intentions in attacking both from the isthmus and by sea may have also been to divert attention away from the lagoon. But when Scipio saw the water indeed begin ebbing out of the northern lagoon channel in the afternoon, as described by fishermen in Tarraco, he gave the order for enough unnoticed Romans—five hundred men carrying ladders—to scale the walls after wading the shallow water. This new small force found the walls there unguarded, climbed over, and quickly entered the city. Here is a curious event, almost a paradox or at least ironic for a culture that once was so careful about its relationship to marine contexts. The general consensus must be that Cartagena’s lagoon provided only an illusion of water depth, since it is very difficult to gauge water depth from a distance.
More than a few have wrestled with this text of “Neptune’s aid” as related somewhat differently by both Polybius and Livy.22 While recent commentators have discussed the phenomenon, the best analysis to date suggests variables of tides and shallow salt flats mixed with offshore wind.23 The deep water of the Cartagena Gulf harbor toward the sea was possibly a better defense, although Roman ships could also approach here without hulling, so, in summary, Cartagena’s perceived impregnability was most likely an illusion.
Scipio’s canny invocation of Neptune from his dream enhanced his standing among Rome’s Spanish forces, perceived as a leader with divine blessing when his soldiers crossed the lagoon. In any event, one historian makes a good case for interpreting Polybius as “attributing Scipio’s success to his own forethought rather than the fortuitous aid of Neptune” in listening to the account of the fishermen of Tarraco who knew the phenomenon of the lagoon’s variable depth.24 This is also firm evidence for Scipio’s capable use of military intelligence long before an established imperial Roman spy-craft service, documenting that Scipio was disposed to and had learned from Hannibal’s example of how to gather intelligence and was also fully able on his own to carefully consider source information and plan accordingly.25
Scaling the undefended walls along the lagoon, the Romans moved rapidly east and killed anyone resisting, also helping to open the isthmus gates that Scipio had placed under renewed assault—his men hacking at the gates with axes but covered by testudo shields (large curved shields that covered at 1 to 2 soldiers when held overhead)—so that the landward forces met about the same time as the seaward forces also scaled the underdefended walls on the south. The Roman forces swept through the city to the citadel, where the remaining Carthaginians had retreated, and soon its surrender was accelerated by the obvious sight of marauding Roman soldiers filling the city, a custom of killing all who stood in their way, as Polybius noted, without looting, to inspire terror in a mayhem that did not even spare animals.26
Not even counting the Carthaginian treasury of silver, the collected booty from Cartagena was indeed huge, brought into the city square and guarded before some of it was distributed among Scipio’s forces. Gold, silver, and military equipment such as catapults are just a few of the materials taken as part of the Roman prize. Some of the silv
er and bullion from Car-tagena may have been claimed as personal fortune by the Barcids themselves and held in reserve there, but now all of this was gone too. Scipio took the Carthaginian commander named Mago and several high-ranking members of Carthage’s Gerousia Council and its Senate as prisoners to be guarded by Gaius Laelius.27 Spanish hostages numbering about three hundred were freed and released back to their tribal homes with gifts on condition of promising to guarantee their tribes would ally with Rome. Many of the city’s slaves were promised freedom after the war if they served Rome; then Scipio allocated them for rowing the eighteen captured Carthaginian ships or to reinforce the Roman rowers of Laelius. This use of slaves as rowers, whether in crisis or not—and to be freed after war service to Rome—may not be at all unique.28
In astute magnanimity he could usually fan into legend, Scipio not only was said to have kept the hostage women from being raped but also turned down one offer the hostages made of a beautiful Spanish maiden, releasing her back to her father and her fiancée, who had hoped to ransom her.29 Livy likely embellishes the story that Scipio gave back the gold for her ransom as a wedding present to the young Spanish chieftain in order to better recruit from his tribe. That Scipio took Cartagena in one day confirms not only that it was inadequately defended—only a thousand Carthaginians and townspeople were pressed into defense—but also that Carthage made a grave error in thinking it was invulnerable with its walls and surrounding water, since the shallow lagoon provided only an illusion of safety.30 Scipio’s strategy was fast coming into parity with that of Hannibal, from whom he had learned well (if unintentionally on Hannibal’s part).